Hungarian Report on the International Criminal Court by Wiener, A. Imre & Ligeti, Katalin
     		  
 		       
 		      !      "		#
 
 
IV. A. 1. International Criminal Court 
IMRE A. WIENER∗—KATALIN LIGETI∗∗ 
 
Hungarian Report on the International Criminal Court 
 
 
Abstract. In the study the legal system is conteptualized as a meaning system which 
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The Rome Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court ended on 17 July 1998 with the adoption of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). The next day the treaty was 
opened for signature at Il Campidoglio in Rome. The purpose of the ICC 
Statute is to create a permanent international criminal court that will effectively 
investigate and prosecute the most serious violations of international human 
rights law: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
 The treaty containing the ICC Statute will enter into force 60 days after 
the sixtieth instrument of ratification is deposited at the United Nations. As of 
12 February 2001, 139 States have signed and 29 States have ratified or 
acceded to the treaty.1 
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1.  New tendencies in international criminal law2 
 
1.1. Ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
 
The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) 
established ad hoc international tribunals. Security Council Resolution 827 
established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Security Council Resolution 
955 established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for acts of genocide or other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in 1994 in the territory of Rwanda and as far 
as Rwandan citizens are concerned, responsible for such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States. 
 According to the Statute of the international tribunal on Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) the tribunal and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. The 
international tribunal has primacy over national courts. At any stage of the 
procedure, the international tribunal may formally request national courts to 
defer to the competence of the international tribunal in accordance with the 
ICTY Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY. (Art.9.) 
 The Prosecutor initiates investigations ex-officio or on the basis of infor-
mation obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United 
Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. The 
Prosecutor assesses the information received or obtained and decide 
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. (Art.18.) 
 
1.2. The Lockerbie case 
 
Besides establishing ad hoc international criminal tribunals the Security 
Council also interfered with international criminal jurisdiction by its 
decision in a concrete case. The UN International Court of Justice has 
confirmed such interference.  

 
2
 This chapter intends to illustrate the changing international climate in which the 
Statute was adopted and which serves as a frame for the current ratification procedure For 
past events see Bassiouni, M. Ch.: Historical Survey: 1919–1998. In: The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, A Documentary History, Complied by Bassiouni, M. Ch.: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc, Ardsley, New York, 1998. 
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 In the Lockerbie case the Security Council demanded in its Resolutions 
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) that Libya submit the two accused Libyan 
nationals for trial before a Scottish court. For the failure to comply with the 
resolutions the Security Council also imposed economic sanctions on Libya. 
 As a response Libya begun proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice against both the US and the UK by arguing that they had failed to 
meet their obligations under the 1971 Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Libya 
claimed its willingness to prosecute those accused of the bombing and by 
this she would have fulfilled her own obligations under the Montreal 
Convention. 
 In a provisional order of 14 April 1992 the International Court of Justice 
decided that the Security Council Resolution based on Article 103 of the 
UN Charter prevails over the obligations of the Parties under any other 
international agreement including those under the Montreal Convention. 
 Accordingly the Security Council in its Resolution 1192 (1998) of 27 
August 1998 called all states to co-operate to ensure the presence of the 
two before a Scottish Court in the Netherlands and suspended the measures 
imposing economic sanctions on Libya. The help of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations was decisive for the transfer of the accused. On 5 
April 1999 the two accused were first surrendered to a United Nations 
official at the Tripoli airport in Libya and later on the same day to the 
Scottish authorities in the Netherlands. 
 
1.3.  Crimes under international humanitarian law 
 
In the Nicaragua case the International Court of Justice observed that the 
laying of mines in the waters of another State without any warning or 
notification is not only an unlawful act but also a breach of the principles 
of humanitarian law underlying the Hague Convention No. VIII. of 1907. 
The Court considered that the rules stated in Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, which is common to the four Conventions, 
applying to armed conflicts of a non-international character should be 
applied. This obligation derives from the general principles of humanitarian 
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.3 

 
3
 Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court 
of Justice. United Nations New York, 1992. 79. Case concerning the military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits) Judgment of 22 December 1986 166. 
266 IMRE A. WIENER—KATALIN LIGETI   
 In the Pinochet case Law Lords emphasised that the immunity of the 
Head of State would simply be incompatible with the provisions of the 
Torture Convention which clearly indicates the official or governmental 
character of torture as a constituent element of the crime. Under customary 
international law there can be no immunity for crimes of international law. 
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain grave offences is 
permitted on the basis of the universality principle. However, if one 
accepts the prohibition of torture as a ius cogens norm such immunity can 
not co-exist with that norm. Since ius cogens norms enjoy the highest 
status within international law they prevail over and invalidate other rules 
of international law. 
 John Hopkins commented on the above cases as follows: “The cases 
show remarkable and, as it appears, unprecedented willingness to rely upon 
provisions of international law, both conventional and customary, in 
domestic proceedings. The relationship between international and municipal 
law will be viewed very differently henceforth. In particular, the apparently 
ready acceptance by the majorities of the notion of ius cogens and of the 
provisions of the Torture Convention (and of certain other treaties) as 
instances of the ius cogens is perhaps surprising.”4 
 
1.4. The opinion of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court made the following elaboration in 
relation to crimes under international humanitarian law: 
 The first sentence of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution, according to which the 
legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognised 
rules of international law, states that these “generally recognised rules” are 
part of Hungarian law, even without separate (further) transformation. An 
act of general transformation—one without a definition or enumeration of 
the rules—was performed by the Constitution itself. According to it, the 
generally recognised rules of international law are not part of the Consti-
tution but are “assumed obligations”. The fact that the assumption and 
transformation are contained in the Constitution does not affect the 
hierarchical relationship of the Constitution, international and domestic law. 
This general internalisation of assumed obligations absolutely does not 
preclude certain “generally recognised rules” from being defined by specific 
international agreements (as well), and that regarding those a separate act of 

 
4
 Hopkins, J.: Case and Comment—Former head of foreign state—extradition—
immunity. The Cambridge Law Journal, Volume 58 Part 3 November 1999. 465. 
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transformation takes place. The United Nations Charter and the Geneva 
Conventions, for instance, may contain such rules. 
 Articles 7 (1) of the Constitution also means that by the Constitution’s 
command, the Republic of Hungary participates in the community of nations: 
this participation, therefore, is a constitutional command for domestic law. It 
follows therefrom that the Constitution and domestic law must be inter-
preted in a manner whereby the generally recognised international rules 
are truly given effect. 
 The second sentence of Art. 7 (1)—the harmonisation of the obligations 
assumed under international law and domestic law—applies to every 
“assumed” international obligation, including the generally recognised rules. 
In addition, harmony must be achieved for the whole of domestic law, the 
Constitution included. Thus, Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution requires the 
harmony of the Constitution and the obligations derived from inter-
national law—assumed directly under the Constitution or undertaken in 
treaties—as well as domestic law: is ensuring their harmonisation, attention 
must be paid to their particular characteristics. 
 Historically, the distinction has been applied with respect of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World 
War. But the development of international law has continuously separated 
the sphere of “international humanitarian law” from the war context and 
made the prosecution and punishment of these crimes independent of the 
requirements and conditions of the domestic criminal law system, also with 
regard to statutory limitations, inasmuch as two conventions on the non-
applicability of statutory limitations for war crimes against humanity have 
been concluded. 
 The rules on the punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity—
since these crimes threaten the foundations of humanity and international 
coexistence—constitute peremptory norms of general international law (ius 
cogens). Those States which refuse to assume these obligations cannot 
participate in the community of nations. 
 The norms on war crimes and crimes against humanity are undoubtedly 
part of customary international law: they are general principles recognised 
by the community of nations in the parlance of the Hungarian Constitution, 
they belong to “the generally recognised rules of international law”. The 
Hungarian legal system accepts these rules, according to the first clause 
of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution, therefore they fall, without separate trans-
formation or adoption, within those “assumed obligations under international 
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law” whose harmony with domestic law is required by the second clause 
of the aforementioned Article of the Constitution.5 
 
1.5. The universality principle 
 
According to Feller the universality principle reflects the special quality of 
the class of offences known as delicta iuris gentium, crimes under inter-
national law. These crimes threaten to undermine the very foundations of 
the enlightened international community as a whole, and it is this quality 
that gives each one of the members of that community the right to extend 
the incidence of its criminal law to them, even though they are committed 
outside the state’s boundaries and the offender has no special connection 
with the state. One essential prerequisite for the application of the municipal 
criminal law of a certain state in a particular case is that the offender be in 
its territory. The link between the offender and the lex loci deprehensionis 
is the injury which the offence causes to the foundations and security of 
the entire international community. This is what endows every state with 
the power to establish by law the incidence of its own municipal criminal 
law on delicta iuris gentium if the offender is actually in custody in its 
territory. 
 The universality principle must necessarily be of a general nature, i.e., 
the personal status of the offender cannot affect the incidence of the municipal 
criminal law by virtue of that principle. The offender may be the national of 
another state, he may be domiciled elsewhere, stateless or with no permanent 
domicile, nevertheless, in each of these cases he will fall within the scope of 
that law, provided that two basic conditions are satisfied, namely, he is 
within the territory of the state that seeks to apply its municipal law and the 
offence is one of those embraced by the universality principle. 
 There is no point here in demanding, as a prerequisite of its applicability, 
the double criminality of the conduct in question, too. The principle holds 
good even when the conduct does not constitute an offence in the place 
where it occurred, that is also the position when the offence is committed 
in a place over which no state has sovereignty.6 

 
5
 Detailed in: Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court László Sólyom and Georg Brunner with a Foreword by Justice 
Stephen G. Breyer (The University of Michigan Press 2000), 273–283. 
 
6
 Feller, S. Z.: Theories and Jurisdiction in: A Treatise on International Criminal 
Law, Volume II Jurisdiction and Cooperation (Charles C Thomas Publisher Springfield 
Illinois USA, 1973), 32–34. 
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 By virtue of the universality principle, some legal systems (e.g. in Hungary) 
provide that proceedings are to be initiated only in cases of this kind by 
the head of prosecutions himself. The reason for this is that in addition to all 
the other considerations to be taken into account in weighing the initiation of 
proceedings in the case of extraterritorial offences, special legal problems 
arise when the offence is an international crime. 
 It is necessary to pay attention to the Belgian Congo case, which is 
pending right now and which may also substantially affect the interpretation 
of the universality principle.  
 An international arrest warrant was issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian 
investigation judge against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The warrant also sought his provisional 
detention as long as a request for extradition to Belgium for alleged crimes 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law are pending. 
Under the very terms of the arrest warrant, the investigating judge claims 
jurisdiction in respect of offences purportedly committed on the territory 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by a national of that State 
without
 an allegation that the victims were of Belgian nationality or that 
these acts constituted violations of the security or dignity of the Kingdom or 
Belgium. 
 Congo pointed out in her reply that such universal jurisdiction is conditional 
on the perpetrators’ presence on the territory of the prosecuting State, and 
these are exceptional heads of jurisdiction, which derive their compliance 
with international law solely from the treaties which provide for them and 
which are not part of general international law. 
 In her declaration, the Belgian Judge Van den Wyngaert emphasised the 
importance of the case for the development of modern international 
criminal law. According to Van den Wyngaert international community 
undoubtedly agrees in principle with the proposition that the core crimes 
of international criminal law (war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity) should not remain unpunished. How this should be realised in 
practice is still the subject of much discussion and debate. Ideally, such 
crimes should be prosecuted before international criminal courts. 
However, not all cases will be justifiable before such courts and in the 
meanwhile national criminal prosecution before domestic courts is the 
only means to enforce international criminal law. States have not only a 
moral but also a legal obligation under international law to ensure that 
they are able to prosecute international core crimes domestically. 
 Judge Van den Wyngaert draws the attention to the growing support 
for the idea that traditional limitations on criminal prosecution (territorial 
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jurisdiction, immunities) cannot be applied to international core crimes. This 
idea is gaining support, not only in legal doctrine but also in national courts’ 
decisions such as the judgement of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case. 
 In contrast to the above opinion the International Court of Justice rejected 
the request of the Kingdom of Belgium that the case be removed from the 
List and found that the circumstances, as they presented themselves in the 
Court, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 
41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.7 
 The arrest warrant issued by the Belgian investigating judge is based on 
the universality principle and not on the priciple of forum deprehensionis. 
This is an important novelty of the case. 
 
 
2. The jurisdiction of the ICC 
 
One should examine the truth of the opinion according to which the 
Statute of the ICC is a step backwards from the position that had been taken 
for the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the concept of 
complementarity provides a major and unnecessary restriction on the 
jurisdiction of the court. Once it had been accepted that these core crimes 
were damaging to the international community and could be tried by an 
international court, the pride of national sovereignty should not have been 
allowed to obstruct the effectiveness of that court.8 
 The Preamble and Art. 1 of the Statute laid down that ICC’s jurisdiction 
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
of the ICC under Article 59 extends, to three well-established international 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They conform 
to existing international criminal law and fall within the meaning of ius 

 
7
 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (International Court of 
Justice, 8 December 2000, General List No. 121). 
  
8
 Elliott, C.: A Permanent International Criminal Court: ‘A Giant Step Towards 
Universal Human Rights’ or ‘Dead on Arrival’? The Journal of Criminal Law, 2000. 401. 
Quotations in the title are taken from the comment of Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of 
the UN, The Times, Monday 20 July 1998. And from the comment of the American 
Senator Jesse Helms before the Rome conference (quoted by the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights at www.lchr.org/lchr/icc/rome/senate.htm). 
  
9
 The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with 
this Statute with respect to the following crimes: 
 (a) The crimes of genocide, (b) Crimes against humanity, (c) War crimes, (d) The 
crime of aggression. 
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cogens
 which is binding upon all states and which contains norms that 
carry obligations from which a state may not derogate. The Statute also 
lists the crime of aggression, which has yet to be defined and is therefore 
not subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction.10 Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction 
also over crimes against the administration of justice and may impose 
sanctions (Article 70, 71). 
 Bassiouni states that “the ICC is a treaty-based institution which is 
binding only on its states parties. It is not a supra-national body, but an 
international body similar to other existing ones. The ICC is not a substitute 
for national criminal jurisdiction and does not supplant national criminal 
justice systems, but rather is “complementary” to them. The ICC does no 
more than what each and every state in the international community can 
do under existing international law.11 It is the expression of collective 
action by states parties to a treaty that established an institution to carry 
out collective justice for certain international crimes. The ICC is, there-
fore, an extension of national criminal jurisdiction as established by a 
treaty whose ratification under national parliamentary authority makes it 
part of national law. Consequently, the ICC neither infringes upon national 
sovereignty nor overrides national legal systems capable of and willing to 
carry out their international legal obligations.12 
 The Court can exercise jurisdiction over crimes that have been committed 
on the territory of a state party or by one of its nationals13. In addition, the 
ICC may exercise its jurisdiction when a state which is not a state party 
consents to the Court’s jurisdiction and the crime has been committed on 
that state’s territory or the accused is one of its nationals. 
 Jurisdiction of the ICC is based on the principle of territorial criminal 
jurisdiction, and not on a theory of universality of criminal jurisdiction. While 
the reach of the Court’s jurisdiction is universal, it does not represent the 
theory of universality, except for “referrals” from the Security Council, which 
are not linked to the territoriality of any state, whether they are Parties or 
non-States-Parties. It is clearly established in international law that whenever 
a crime is committed on the territory of a given state, it can prosecute the 
perpetrator even when that person is a non-national. Accordingly, every 
state has the right, in accordance with its constitutional norms, to transfer 

 
10
 Bassiouni, M. Ch.: Explanatory Note on the ICC Statute, in: Revue Internationale 
de Droit Pénal 71eme année, 1er et 2eme trimestres, 1–39. 
 
11
 Compare with conclusions of this chapter. 
 
12
 Bassiouni: op. cit. point 6. 
 
13
 Bassiouni: ibid. point 15. 
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jurisdiction to another state which has jurisdiction over an individual 
accused of committing a crime, or to an international adjudicating body.14 
 On the basis of the above Bassiouni argues that since the ICC is not a 
foreign legal system (such as that of a sovereign state), after ratification of 
the treaty, it becomes an extension of a state’s national criminal jurisdiction. 
This is not to be confused with the idea that the ICC is an extension of 
national criminal justice systems. The ICC is neither part of national criminal 
justice systems nor an extension thereof. It is an extension of national 
criminal jurisdiction established by treaty and implemented by national 
legislation. The closest analogy is that of transfer of criminal proceedings. 
Thus, an individual is “surrendered” to the ICC and not extradited.15 A 
consequence of that concept is that states parties could not invoke, in 
opposition to surrender, their domestic laws that prohibit extradition of 
nationals, or other defences.16 
 In order to evaluate Bassiouni’s opinion it is necessary to know Article 
12, 13 and 17 of the ICC Statute. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
if one or more State Parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or 
a State which is not a Party to the Statute accept the exercise of juris-
diction by the Court (Art. 12). The Court may exercise its jurisdiction if: 
crimes appear to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a 
State, or by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, or the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation. 
(Art. 13.) The Court shall determine that a case is admissible if the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 
In order to determine unwillingness, the Court shall consider that the 
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
or there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings, the proceedings 
were not conducted independently or impartially (Art. 17). 
 Bassiouni acknowledges that it is up to the Court to determine that a 
state is unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute, the proceedings 
are not conducted independently or impartially, national judicial system is 
totally or substantially collapsed.17 

 
14
 Bassiouni: ibid. point 16. 
 
15
 Article 102: For the purposes of this Statute: (a) “surrender” means the delivering 
up of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute. (b) “extradition” means 
the delivering up of a person by on a State to another as provided by treaty, convention or 
national legislation. 
 
16
 Bassiouni: op. cit. point 94. 
 
17
 Bassiouni: ibid. point 58. 
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 A conviction or acquittal by a national jurisdiction will not bar subsequent 
prosecution by the ICC if: (a) the purposes of the state proceedings were to 
“shield the person concerned form criminal responsibility” or the domestic 
proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially.18 
 According to Art. 13 the Court may not only then exercise its jurisdiction 
if a States Party or a non-State Party initiates proceedings at the public 
prosecutor. The Security Council enjoys the same right, too. Next to those 
exists the public prosecutor’s independent right to initiate proceedings. 
Although the public prosecutor’s right of initiative is dependent on the 
support of one of the councils of the Court, it nevertheless removes the 
initiating of the procedure from the exercise of national jurisdiction.  
 The Security Council besides its independent right of initiative may 
exercise further influence on the functioning of the Court according to the 
terms of Art. 16. The activity of the Security Council interferes with national 
jurisdiction as it happened in the Lockerbie case, when with its Resolutions 
748/1992 and 883/1993 interfered into a concrete cases and ordered 
economic sanctions against Libya. 
 The Statute itself declares in Art. 17 when does the jurisdiction of the 
ICC overrides national jurisdiction. The principles of the primacy of national 
legal systems and the ICC’s “complementarity” are evident in other provisions 
of the Statute. Article 15(4) requires the authorisation of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber before the Prosecutor commences an investigation proprio motu 
as opposed to when it is referred by a state party or the Security Council 
/Article 15/.19 Contrary to Bassiouni’s opinion, Art. 15 does not restrict 
the Court, it restricts only the prosecutor.  
 Furthermore Art. 27 fundamentally restricts the exercise of national 
jurisdiction by prohibiting any immunities provided for in the national law 
in the course of the Court’s proceedings.  
 On the basis of the above one may conclude that it is the sovereignty 
of those states which did not ratify the convention that “obstruct the 
effectiveness of that court”. On the other hand, for the states parties the ICC 
represent a restriction of their national jurisdiction. Moreover, the ICC does 
less than “what each and every state in the international community can do 
under existing international law”,20 since according to international law 
states may prosecute hard core crimes on the basis of the universality 
principle regardless who committed those crimes and where. It is unclear, 

 
18
 Bassiouni: ibid. point 63. 
 
19
 Bassiouni: ibid. point 9. 
 
20
 See: supra note 12. 
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however, whether this is obligatory for the ICC upon prosecution initiated 
by the Security Council. This would be only then the case, if the Security 
Council is not bound by the complementary principle. 
 
 
Answers to the questionnaire 
 
3.1. Hungary has not yet ratified the ICC Statute. The ratification procedure is 
currently under preparation.  
 
3.2. There is no objection in Hungary against establishing the ICC. Never-
theless the ICC represents a brand new type of institution, therefore its 
implementation into the domestic law requires thorough preparation. One 
possible way of ratifying the Statute would be, if the Hungarian Parliament 
first ratified it with a special law and provided for the necessary modification 
of several Hungarian laws only then when the 60 ratifications are deposited 
and the Statute enters into force. There is so far no decision in Hungary 
about the method of ratification. 
 
3.3. Since the ICC interferes also with the exclusionary domestic jurisdiction 
based on the territoriality principle, the chapter of the Hungarian Constitution 
dealing with the court system needs to be modified accordingly.  
 
At present the Hungarian Constitution provides as follows: 
Article 45. 
 (1) In the Republic of Hungary justice is administered by the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Hungary, the Court of the Capital, the 
county ourts and the local courts.  
 (2) Special courts for specific groups of cases may be established by 
law. 
Article 47. 
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary determines the guidelines 
for the operation and administration of justice in all courts. The 
guidelines and principles established by the Supreme Court are of 
binding nature for all courts.  
 
3.4. Upon ratification the responsibility of the head of state as set out at present 
in Art. 31/A and 32 of the Hungarian Constitution requires modification. 
The Hungarian Constitution does not contain further provisions in respect of 
the responsibility of other leading politicians. 
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The responsibility of the head of state is regulated as follows: 
 
Article 31/A. 
 (1) The person of the President of the Republic is inviolable; protection 
from criminal prosecution shall be granted by a separate law.  
 (2) Should the President of the Republic violate the Constitution or any 
other law while in office, a motion supported by one-fifth of the 
Members of Parliament may propose that impeachment proceedings 
be initiated against the President of the Republic. 
 (3) A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament 
is required to initiate impeachment proceedings. Voting shall be 
held by secret ballot.  
 (4) From passage of this resolution by the Parliament until the conclusion 
of the impeachment proceedings, the President of the Republic may 
not attend to any of the duties of his office.  
 (5) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in such cases.  
 (6) Should the Constitutional Court determine that the law was violated, it 
shall have the authority to remove the President of the Republic 
from office. 
 
Article 32. 
 (1) If impeachment proceedings are initiated against the President of the 
Republic on the basis of an indictable offence committed in connection 
with official activities while in office, then the Constitutional Court shall 
also apply the basic provisions of criminal prosecution in its proceedings. 
The prosecution shall be represented by a Special Prosecutor elected 
from among the Members of Parliament.  
 (2) In other cases, criminal proceedings against the President of the 
Republic may only be initiated subsequent to the end of his term of 
office.  
 (3) Should the Constitutional Court find the President of the Republic 
guilty of an intentional criminal offence, it may remove the President 
of the Republic from office and simultaneously apply any punishment 
and measures prescribed for such offence in the Penal Code.  
 
3.5. Further immunities are not contained in the Constitution, but in special 
laws. Immunity means in those cases not the exemption from criminal 
responsibility. It contains special procedural rules for waiver of immunity. 
Such waiver is a prerequisite of commencing criminal proceedings. 
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The following special laws need to be modified: 
— Act No. 1972/V on the Public Prosecution Office 
— Act No. 1989/XXXII on the Constitutional court 
— Act No. 1993/LIX on the Legal Status of Members of Parliament  
— Act No. 1993/CX on National Defence  
— Act No. 1977/LXVI on the Structure and Functioning of the Courts 
— Act No. 1989/XXXVIII on the Hungarian Court of Auditors 
— Act No. 1978/IV on the Hungarian Criminal Code 
— Act No. 1996/XXXVIII on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
 
3.6. Once the ICC is implemented into domestic law, it would be a 
contradiction within the national legal system, if different rules applied to 
proceedings before the ICC and proceedings before a domestic court.  
 
3.7. Upon ratification of the ICC Art. 102 of the Statute becomes part of 
Hungarian law. Art. 102 distinguishes between extradition and surrender. 
The Hungarian Constitution does not prohibit the extradition of own nationals. 
Surrender is, however, a new institution also within the Hungarian legal 
system. It was first introduced by the ICTY Statute that Hungary ratified. 
Nevertheless no surrender of Hungarian nationals has taken place so far on 
the basis of that provision. 
 
3.8. Hungarian law contains provisions on lifetime imprisonment and 
Hungarian courts may decide that the sentenced person can be on conditional 
release only after a period of 30 years. Consequently, the ratification of the 
ICC Statute would not pose any problems in that respect. 
 The part 10 of Statute the Enforcement. According to Art. 103 a sentence 
of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a 
list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept 
sentenced persons. Rule 199: Unless provided otherwise in the Rules, the 
functions of the Court under Part 10 shall be exercised by the Presidency. 
Rule 200/2: The Presidency shall not include a State on the list provided 
for in article 103, paragraph (1), if it does not agree with the conditions 
that such a State attaches to its acceptance. The Presidency may request 
any additional information from that State prior taking a decision. The Rules 
200–225 regulate the enforcement.21 
 

 
21
 In: Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 71eme année, 1er et 2eme trimestres 2000 
203–215.  
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3.9. According to section 3.3. of the present report, the proceedings of the 
prosecutor of the ICC may only serve as the preparation for the functioning 
of the previously accepted jurisdiction.  
 
3.10. Both Art. 29 of the ICC Statute and Art. 33(2)b of the Hungarian 
Criminal Code prohibit any statutory limitation in connection with the 
crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is rather unlikely that 
the perpetrator of such crimes may receive pardon. Should this be the case, 
however, in our view Art. 17(1)a of the Statute could then be applicable 
according to which it could be classified as if “the State is unwilling to 
carry out the investigation or the prosecution.” 
 
